We present data of a contingent valuation survey, testing the effect of evaluation mode on the monetary valuation of preventing road accidents. Half of the interviewees was asked to state their willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce the risk of having only 1 type of injury (separate evaluation, SE), and the other half of the sample was asked to state their WTP for 4 types of injuries evaluated simultaneously (joint evaluation, JE). In the SE group, we observed lack of sensitivity to scope while in the JE group WTP increased with the severity of the injury prevented. However, WTP values in this group were subject to context effects. Our results suggest that the traditional explanation of the disparity between SE and JE, namely, the so-called "evaluability," does not apply here. The paper presents new explanations based on the role of preference imprecision. 
| INTRODUCTION
There is a debate about the validity of contingent valuation (CV) as an appropriate technique to inform social policies. Although some critics (Hausman, 2012) think that it is a "hopeless" method, others (Carson, 2012) consider that, although the method is not perfect, it can be a useful technique to incorporate people's preferences in public decisions. An important part of the dispute focuses on the issue of scope effects. In order to improve the method, Heberlein, Wilson, Bishop, and Schaeffer (2005) consider that "we need to better understand the conditions that produce scope failure" (p. 2). In this spirit, this paper focuses on the evaluation mode (EM; separate vs. joint). We study whether EM makes a difference in the sensitivity of responses to scope in the specific domain of health state valuations.
There is a good deal of evidence (Bazerman, Moore, Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, & Blount, 1999; Hsee, 1996; Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999; Hsee & Zhang, 2010) showing that subjects perceive the value of objects differently when they are presented in isolation (separate evaluation [SE] mode) or together (joint evaluation [JE] mode) and a mismatch between SE and JE valuations arises. More specifically, some individuals are willing to pay more for object A than for B when they are evaluated independently (SE) but are willing to pay more for B than for A when they are presented together (JE). This type of preference reversal has implications for the use of CV in public policy. Most public decisions temporarily (5 years) preserve 50 acres of Maryland farmland." Subjects were willing to pay the same for both goods in SE, but they were willing to pay more for the good providing more benefit in JE. The effect in environmental goods was not as strong as with baseball cards, that is, instead of "more is less" they found that "more is the same." For this reason, Alevy et al. (2011) made a distinction between strong EM effects ("more is less") and weak EM effect ("more is the same"). Given that in both papers the results of JE are in line with normative theory (i.e., higher WTP for better goods), it could be thought that JE is a better EM. However, this depends on the way that those results are explained, as we show next.
The main explanation of the EM effect on preferences has been evaluability (Hsee, 1996) . In order to explain the concept of evaluability and how it relates to scope effects, we will consider a model typically used in psychophysics and illustrated here in Figure 1 .
Two functions are necessary to value an object using WTP (or any other response scale). One function (H) generates the impact of the object on the subjectivity of the individual (e.g., how well or badly this object is perceived). The other function (J) associates the response scale to the subjective impression. Hsee and Zhang (2010) define evaluability as "the extent to which a person has relevant reference information to gauge the desirability of target values and map them onto evaluation" (pp. 344-345) . This definition implies that evaluability encompasses two aspects: how easy it is for people to figure out how much utility an object is going to generate ("desirability") and how easy it is for people to translate ("map") this on the scale that is used to estimate the value of objects (money in CV). Desirability relates to the H function, and mapping relates to the J function. We will show how these two elements of evaluability relate to sensitivity to scope in JE. It is important to disentangle the origin of these effects because they may have implications for the normative status of each EM as a guide to public policy. One example of the use of JE versus SE to disentangle the effect of the H and J functions in health is the study by Lacey et al. (2011) . They observed that patients and members of the general population value several health problems differently using a visual analogue scale (VAS). They try to show if this disparity is produced by VAS being used differently by the two groups (the J function) or because health is perceived differently (the H function).
| Information effects
The first reason that could lead to higher sensitivity to scope in JE is that in this EM, subjects have more and better information to evaluate the quality of products. This helps subjects to understand more clearly how much utility an object can produce, how desirable it is (the H function), and how much they are willing to pay for the better object (scope effects). One reason that explains this effect is that some attributes are difficult to evaluate in isolation (in SE). One classic example (Hsee, 1996) is the choice between two dictionaries that are defined by two attributes, namely, the number of words and how new they look. The attribute that is easy to evaluate in SE is how new the dictionary looks, but the number of words is difficult to evaluate in isolation. The consequence is that in SE, the difficult-to-evaluate attribute is underweighted. However, in JE, subjects can compare the number of words of the dictionaries and it is easier for them to judge the quality of the dictionary by performing relative comparisons. In this case, JE is more sensitive to scope (number of words) because it provides more "relevant reference information." This explanation is used by Lacey et al. (2006) to explain some of their results when they state that the descriptions of health problems in JE provided "useful information about the range of severity that can be expected for the disease" (p. 151). In the same way Gyrd-Hansen et al. (2011) claim that the reduced sensitivity to differences in risk reduction in SEs could be produced by the lack of comparators (i.e., lack of reference information). In the case of Smith (2007) , this reference information is provided by the cost of the reference good. Donaldson et al. (2008) conclude that "the main possibility of differences between JE and SE being due to informational effects" (p. 15).
A second reason, also related to information, is that in JE, subjects use wider frames in order to evaluate products. Assume that we evaluate two objects (A and B) and that A is, objectively, better than B. For example, A is a premium smartphone and B is a mid-range smartphone. However, assume that A is the worst within premium smartphones, and B is the best within midrange smartphones. Leclerc, Hsee, and Nunes (2005) show that in SE, each object is evaluated within its category (what they call narrow focusing) leading to lower WTP for the best smartphone. This effect disappears in JE because subjects compare between mid-range and premium smart phones and are willing to pay more for the premium smartphone. That is, WTP reflects FIGURE 1 Evaluation model e306the objective ranking A ≻ B. If this is the explanation of the difference between SE and JE, it seems logical to conclude that JE is a better EM to guide public policy. The disparity between EMs has also been explained in terms of a change in reference point (Leclerc et al., 2005) . In SE, each object is evaluated using its immediate category (e.g., premium smartphones) as the reference point. This implies that in SE, each object is considered good or bad according to its ranking position in its own category. In JE, each smartphone is compared against the other so the reference point is an object of a different category. This implies that subjects use a wider frame of reference in JE than in SE. It seems that this kind of argument is also used by Donaldson et al. (2008) when they state that in SE, subjects evaluate health programs in relation to inappropriate reference points and in JE, a relevant alternative is presented. In summary, more information in JE leads to better reference points.
| Imprecision or stochastic preferences
Differences between EM in CV studies may also reflect the difficulty that people have in measuring the desirability of an object with the money metric [J (X)]. Even if subjects have a good idea of how good an object is [H (X)] and attributes are evaluable in isolation, subjects may find it difficult to estimate with precision the monetary equivalent of the utility gain they can get from the consumption of some objects.
To explain how imprecision can account for discrepancies between both EMs, we assume that preferences are stochastic-the same subject might respond in a slightly different way to the same WTP question in different moments. We can think of individual preferences as a distribution of WTP values that the subject thinks are "reasonable" for an object (in our case to avoid a health problem). The WTP of one subject for object g will be defined as a random . Assume that, later on, she is asked a WTP question for object f. She responds choosing one number from L f . Let us assume that (as will be the case in our study) g dominates f, that is, g is better than f in some dimensions and it is not worse than f in the rest of the dimensions (e.g., f is the "less" object and g is the "more" object). If there is some overlap between L g and L f then in SE, because of the degree of overlapping, WTP g < WTP f could be observed. We hypothesise that the subject will not choose any pair (WTP g , WTP f ) such that WTP g < WTP f in JE because she will try to be internally consistent between the two WTP amounts stated. She may apply a social norm, in line with norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) , that says you are expected to pay more for something that is better. If this is the case, subjects will not use the whole distributions L g and L f in JE when they respond to WTP questions. Subjects will truncate those distributions in order to avoid transparent violations of dominance (the social norm , the theory just explained predicts that E[WTP(g)] will be larger than E[WTP(f)] in JE, indicating that we could observe sensitivity to scope in JE and insensitivity to scope in SE.
The idea that preferences are stochastic has a long tradition in economics (Mosteller & Nogee, 1951) . Individual preferences are probabilistic and they are better represented by probability distributions than by a single value (deterministic preferences). There is evidence that moving from deterministic to stochastic preferences is all we need to explain some nonstandard preferences. One example is Butler and Loomes (2007) who show how stochastic or imprecise preferences can explain preference reversals between matching and choice. Another example is Blavatskyy's (2007) truncated error model. This model explains violations of expected utility using two characteristics of preferences that we also use in this paper. One is that probability distributions can (sometimes) be truncated. The second one is that people do not commit transparent errors; for example, people never choose a dominated alternative when dominance is transparent. Those assumptions can explain some biases in the way that people value objects. For example, assume that subjects have to state the monetary equivalent of a lottery with two monetary outcomes. Blavatskyy (2007) assumes that this monetary equivalent can be represented by a stochastic variable that is truncated by the two monetary outcomes of the lottery. Nobody will state a monetary equivalent larger than the highest outcome of the lottery or lower than the lowest outcome. This model implies that lotteries whose expected utility is close to the utility of the lowest possible outcome are more likely to be overvalued than undervalued (and vice versa) . Similarly, our model assumes that imprecision and the attempt to be internally consistent leads to truncated distributions in JE as explained above.
In this section, we have presented two reasons that can explain why JE can produce WTP values in line with sensitivity to scope; our study can also help to understand those reasons. If JE is more sensitive to scope because it provides the relevant information, the difference between SE and JE will vanish if we also give this information to those who are in SE. In fact, there is some evidence that would support this explanation. Sher and McKenzie (2014) showed one group of subjects (group 1) objects A and B and they were asked to provide their WTP only for object A. They also presented objects A and B to another group (group 2), but they were asked about their WTP only for object B. Finally, they asked another group (group 3) about their WTP for objects A and B in JE. They found that WTP was the same in SE and in JE. This result is important because it suggests that giving more information led to more consistent results. Our second explanation in terms of stochastic preferences and internal consistency would not hold.
In summary, if the disparity between EMs disappears when subjects have the same information in SE and JE, we can conclude that the difference between EMs comes from the different amount of information they convey. The implication would be that public policy should be based on WTP elicited in the JE mode or, at least, that in SE mode, subjects should be provided the same information received by those who are in JE mode. If the disparity between EM is not reduced when subjects have the same information in both EMs, the implications are different. In this case, it is not so clear that JE is a better normative EM than SE. This paper aims at providing more evidence about the reasons of the relationship between the EMs and scope sensitivity that could serve as an input for a normative choice between EMs.
3 | THE SURVEY
| Participants and design
The survey was part of a project funded by the Spanish Ministry of Transport in order to estimate the value of nonfatal road injuries in road traffic accidents. A sample of 2016 subjects, representative of the Spanish adult general population were recruited. Respondents were selected by means of proportional stratified sampling by region, place of residence, gender, and age of the respondent.
Eight types of injuries (S1, S2, …, S8) were selected based on Jones-Lee, Loomes, and Philips (1995). Some minor modifications were made in order to produce dominance between all injuries. Dominance is interpreted here as a clear ranking in terms of severity, that is, S1 ≽ … ≽ S8. The descriptions of the health states can be seen in Appendix S1. These descriptions were presented to the respondents labelled as F, W, X, V, S, R, N, and L, respectively, to avoid any suggested severity order.
The survey was administered through computer-assisted personal interview. The first part of the survey was an introduction that gave subjects information about the risk of road accidents in Spain. We also collected information about car use and attitudes toward road safety and perceptions about subjective risk.
Subjects were randomly allocated into eight subgroups. Each group evaluated four of the eight injuries using ranking, VAS and a modified standard gamble (MSG) method before proceeding to the CV question(s); see Table 1 . The rest of the questionnaire aimed at collecting sociodemographic information.
As shown in Table 1 , in all groups, subjects had to rank four injuries as well as value them through the VAS and the MSG with the differences between SE and JE groups occurring in the CV tasks. In groups 1 to 4 (SE), respondents only saw the description of the injury they had to value using WTP. On the contrary, subjects in groups 5 to 8 (JE) were presented with SE  1  254  S1, S2, S7, S8  S1  2  251  S3, S4, S7, S8  S4  3  256  S3, S4, S5, S6  S3  4  251  S1, S2, S5, S6  S6  JE  5  253  S1, S2, S7, S8  S1, S2, S7, S8  6  250  S3, S4, S7, S8  S3, S4, S7, S8  7  248  S3, S4, S5, S6  S3, S4, S5, S6  8 253 S1, S2, S5, S6 S1, S2, S5, S6
Note. CV = contingent valuation; JE = joint evaluation; SE = separate evaluation; VAS = visual analogue scale; MSG = modified standard gamble.
the four health states they were going to value on the same screen, and then were asked about their WTP to reduce the risk of each of the injuries.
| Framing and CV elicitation
The ranking task was very simple because subjects had to rank the health states from best to worst. Once they had ranked the four health states, they had to value them on a line with the extremes identified as the "Best Imaginable Health State" (value 100) and the "Worst Imaginable Health State" (value 0). They also had to place "full health" and "death" on this scale and could say if some health states were so bad that they preferred to be dead rather than suffering those health states. After this task, they had to evaluate the same four health states, randomly ordered, using an MSG. In this method, subjects are asked to choose between two lotteries. In one lottery, the outcomes are full health (FH) and death (D), and in the other lottery, they are the health state to be evaluated (S1 … S8) and death (D). In the gamble with outcomes (S1 … S8) and D the risk of death was fixed at 0.001 (1 in 1000), so lottery A is [0.999, S i ; D] i = 1, … 8. The probabilities (p) in the other lottery [p, FH; D] were adjusted until indifference was reached. Applications of the MSG are found in other studies (Bleichrodt, Abellan-Perpiñan, Pinto-Prades, & Mendez-Martinez, 2007; Carthy et al., 1998; Law, Pathak, & McCord, 1998 and Robinson, Spencer, & Moffatt, 2015) . The relevant point for this paper is to stress that subjects were very familiar with the four health states they had to value in monetary terms before proceeding to the CV questions, both in SE and in JE. Figure 2 is a screenshot of the CV question for group 1 in SE. The task was explained to the subjects, and they were only shown the description of the only injury they were going to value using WTP, in this case injury F (i.e., S1; see left panel in Figure 2 ). They were told that there was a new safety device that could reduce injuries like F (in the example) in the case of a car accident from 15 to 10 in 100,000. The safety device was personal, and it had a lifespan of 1 year.
An example of the CV question is as follows 1 :
Suppose you are offered a safety device, recently discovered, that can reduce the risk of health status F as a result of a traffic accident. This device, which is individual, can be used in any means of transport and has a lifespan of one year.
Suppose your risk of injury, such as F, as a result of a traffic accident is 15 in 100000 and that there exists a safety device that will reduce your risk of health status, such as F, in a traffic accident by 5/100000, from 15 in 100000 to 10 in 100000.
1 In the introductory part of the survey, a question was presented to subjects in order to check whether they understood risk ratios. The question was, "Imagine that the probability of dying from a car accident is 1% (1 in 100 fatal accidents). In this situation, how many people would die for each group of 1,000?" 97.17% of respondents answered the expected and correct answer (i.e. "10 people"). Then they were asked how many people would die for each group of 10,000. In this case, 94,59% were correct (i.e., answered "100 people"). The huge majority, 94%, answered correctly both questions. We used a set of payment cards in order to ask WTP questions. Each card represented an amount of Euros among these quantities: 10, 30, 50, 100, 150, 300, 600, 1,000, 3,000, 6,000, 10,000, 30,000, 100,000, and 300,000. The method can be seen with the help of the right panel of Figure 2 . A payment card showing a certain amount of money randomly appeared at the centre of the screen, and respondents had to assign the card to one of the next categories: (a) "I would pay this amount for sure" (square at the right); (b) "I would not pay this amount for sure" (square at the left); and (c) "I am not sure whether I would pay or not" (square at the bottom). For example, in Figure 2 , a hypothetical respondent would definitely pay €50 or less and would definitely not pay €100 or more. When all the cards were allocated to the corresponding categories, an open-ended question enquired about the maximum amount of money they would pay within the range defined by the highest amount that they would pay for sure and the lowest amount that they would not pay for sure (in our example between €50 and €100). This open response is the WTP that we use in this study. During the whole process, the description of the injury being valued was shown to the respondents on a paper card that was placed in front of them.
In JE, subjects were first shown a screen with the four health states that they had to evaluate (Figure 3) . It was explained that road traffic accidents could generate injuries of different severity, and they were shown the four that they had already seen before in the VAS and in the MSG exercise. They were told that they were going to be offered four devices that could reduce the risk of having four types of injuries. Each device could reduce the risk of one of those injuries. As in SE, they were told that others could not use this device and the risk reduction was effective only over the next annual period. Then they moved to a sequence of four screens. Each of the four screens was identical to the screen that was used to ask the WTP question in SE. The order of the injuries was random.
| Hypotheses
This design makes it possible to test several hypotheses. If information is the explanation behind the disparity between SE and JE, we hypothesise that in our survey, there will be no differences between EMs. That is, H1 WTP(S i ) SE = WTP(S i ) JE for i = 1, 3, 4 and 6. The reason for this hypothesis is that subjects in SE had the same relevant information as subjects in JE when they were asked the WTP question. All groups in SE and JE had evaluated the same set of health states using different techniques (ranking, visual analogue scale, and standard gamble) before the CV exercise, so we assume that they had the same relevant reference information in both EMs.
If this hypothesis does not hold and WTP in SE and JE are different, the explanation in terms of preference imprecision and internal consistency can be tested. We then make the next hypotheses:
H2 WTP(S1) JE < WTP(S1) SE .
H3 WTP(S3) JE < WTP(S3) SE .
H4 WTP(S6) JE > WTP(S6) SE .
These come from the theory provided in Section 2.3. Because S1 and S3 are the less severe health states in their respective groups in JE, preference imprecision or internal consistency predicts that WTP distributions will be truncated from above (the part of the distribution with higher values). In the case of S6, it is the opposite. Although for S4, no clear prediction can be made because it is in the middle and truncation can affect both sides of the distribution of WTP values.
| RESULTS

| Sample characteristics
Sociodemographic and attitudinal characteristics of our sample can be seen in Table 2 for the total sample and for each of the eight groups. We also show the distribution of adult population with respect to age and gender, according to the Spanish 2011 census, and with respect to education, marital status, and employment status, according to the Labour Force Survey (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2011).
2 In general, our sample resembles the characteristics of the population. More information was collected about other characteristics as shown in Table 2 . We performed a Chi 2 test for independence between groups and each of the characteristics. We could only reject the null hypothesis for employment status at 5% of error. All the remaining characteristics appear to be equally distributed among groups.
| Testing the hypotheses
The impact of the EM on WTP can be seen in Table 3 . We deal with outliers in two ways. The first one is trimming; specifically, we trimmed the top 2% of the values (five observations per group). The second is winsorization (Kahneman & Ritov, 1994) , that is, the 12 highest observations (about 5% of each group) were substituted with the value of the 13th highest one. On the lower part of the scale, nothing was changed because the 13th lowest observation always coincided with the 12 previous observations (they were 0). We prefer to present the results using winsorization because it does not change the shape of the distribution. Nonetheless, the results of the statistical tests are the same using winsorization or removing five outliers. Means and medians are also very similar with the two strategies we used to deal with outliers. We can see that means and medians follow the expected pattern (the higher the severity of the health state, the higher the WTP) in JE. In SE, medians are the same for S1 and S3, and they are also the same for S4 and S6. This suggests insensitivity to scope in SE for some comparisons. In SE, there were no statistically significant differences between S1 and S3 or between S4 and S6 showing lack of scope sensitivity. However, statistically significant differences (p value < .01) were found between all health states in JE.
It can be seen that H1 does not hold in most of the cases. Only in two cases-S3 and S4 (group 7)-there are no differences between SE and JE. In the rest of the cases, differences are in line with hypotheses H2, H3, and H4. H2 holds in the two tests, that is, S1 SE is greater than S1 G5 JE and S1 G8 JE . H3 holds when S3 SE is compared with S3 G6 JE . H4 holds in the two tests. However, in the case of S4, we do not observe a clear pattern, as we could expect from theory. In one case, the WTP is higher in SE than in JE, and in the other case, it is the opposite. Overall, the results suggest that the explanation of the data in terms of imprecision plus (Continues) internal consistency seems plausible. Information cannot account for differences between EMs given that it was the same in all groups.
In relation to sensitivity to scope, we can see that, in SE, subjects were not sensitive to scope between health states S1 and S3 but in JE they were sensitive to scope in all cases. However, even when subjects were sensitive to scope in SE, there were clear differences in the values elicited with SE or JE. There is much more overlap in the WTP distributions in SE than in JE. This is clearly seen in the box-plot diagram in Figure 4 . The consequence of the above is that the relative values of health states are very different in the two EMs. In JE, the ratios of WTP values are more extreme. For example, in JE, the ratio of means between injury S1 and S6 is 8.11 (€635.9/€78.4) and in SE is 2.4 (€436.7/€181.3). This implies that avoiding one injury like S6 is equivalent to avoiding eight injuries like S1 using JE but only 2.4 injuries like S1 using SE.
| Further results
Other results suggest that WTP values in JE are influenced to some extent by some kind of strategy used by subjects to be internally consistent. We can see (Table 4 ) that in almost all cases, the differences between WTP values are statistically significant within each group even if health states are not too different (e.g., S1 and S2). However, there were several cases where the differences did not reach statistical significance when health states were compared between groups even within JE.
Another result that adds to this evidence is presented in Table 5 . We show the percentage of subjects who made a mistake (reported a higher WTP for the less severe health state) and the percentage of subjects who reported exactly the same WTP. Those results suggest some kind of process to be internally consistent. If subjects had responded to each WTP question independently from each other, we would have observed a fair amount of errors for similar health states (e.g., S1 vs. S2) and almost no errors for very different health states (e.g., S1 vs. S8). Errors should have been inversely related to the difference between the severity of health states. We do not observe anything like that. Instead, we see almost no errors in all cases, no matter how similar or dissimilar the health states are, and a large number of subjects providing exactly the same response for health states that are different. We interpret that result as evidence of internal consistency. That is, subjects are not sure about which is their true WTP but they understand that it is illogical to pay more for something worse (the norm). However, it appears that they do not see anything wrong in providing the same response to two health states.
| DISCUSSION
We have seen that the values elicited for different health states change with the EM used to elicit preferences. More specifically, we have seen that in SE, subjects are (to some extent) insensitive to scope. We have also seen that in JE, subjects discriminate more between health states. Similar results have also been observed in Lacey et al. (2006) and Gyrd-Hansen et al. (2011) . Lacey et al. (2006) find that the difference between the value of a mild and a severe lung problem increased from 21 points in SE to 54 points in JE on a 0-100 rating scale. Gyrd-Hansen et al. (2011) observed that the differences between two risk reductions were higher in JE than in SE. Another result, in line with our findings, in Gyrd-Hansen et al. (2011) is that 52.5% of subjects in JE gave the same value to two risk reductions but nobody gave a higher value to the smallest risk reduction. This suggests some kind of effort from subjects to be internally consistent, as it also seems to be happening in our study. Differences between EMs have usually been attributed to informational effects (evaluability). Donaldson et al. (2008) find that WTP for a cancer screening program is more likely to be higher when elicited together with a treatment or a rehabilitation programme (JE). Similar results are obtained, though less conclusive, for the treatment and rehabilitation programmes and they attribute these findings to informational effects. We argue in this paper that evaluability does not seem to be the only explanation of the disparity between EMs. In fact, in the case of health states, we could assume that subjects should be more or less familiar with the severity of health outcomes. As Lacey et al. (2006) say "in the case of our lung disease scenarios, the evaluability of lung disease severity should not have been especially poor" (p. 151). We think that most subjects would be able to think of a mild headache as a mild health problem and of a metastatic cancer as a very severe problem without the need of the information provided by JE. This is why it is important to explain the effect of response mode in a different way, as done in this Not significant at 5% level using Mann-Whitney.
Note. EM = evaluation mode; JE = joint evaluation; SE = separate evaluation; WTP = willingness to pay.
paper. We present a complementary explanation based on the stochastic nature of human preferences combined with the attempt to be internally consistent. We started our paper asking if CV can be improved using JE Mode. If by "improving" we mean to produce values that are more sensitive to scope, the answer is affirmative: JE produces values that are more in line with what we would expect G5  G8  G5  G8  G6  G7  G6  G7  G7  G8  G7  G8  G5  G6 S2 G5 0.000 0.069 G8 0.000 0.000 S3 G6 0.003 0.024 0.603 0.099 G7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.148 S4 G6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.139 G7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 S5 G7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 G8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.650 S6 G7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 G8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.765 0.000 S7 G5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.413 0.311 0.710 0.017 0.206 G6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.307 0.025 0.762 0.469 S8 G5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.113 0.008 0.713 0.191 0.000 0.538 G6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.001 0.350 0.061 0.003 0.609 a P-values in bold if not significant at 5%. from theory. This cannot be attributed to improved evaluability: subjects understanding better how severe a health problem is in JE. Part of the explanation of the scope effects that we have observed in JE seems to reflect the adjustments that subjects make in order to be internally consistent. What are the implications of this finding for CV? Should we elicit WTP values in SE or in JE? There are several ways to respond to those questions depending on views about preferences. Under the assumption that social policy should be based on consistent and stable individual preferences, our results could be read as supporting the idea that CV cannot be trusted. In theory, preferences should not depend on the EM. However, we see that they do vary depending on the EM. A different approach is to accept that WTP questions for risk reductions are difficult for members of the general population and that, even if they are imprecise and stochastic, they provide valuable information for the social decision maker. For those who hold this second view, we provide some arguments to defend the use of JE.
First, we may think that the internal consistency observed in JE is an example of coherent arbitrariness (Ariely, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2003) and it does not provide any evidence for the superiority of JE over SE. However, we do not think that WTP responses in JE can necessarily be understood as "arbitrary." In Experiment 1 of Ariely et al. (2003) , the first response is considered arbitrary because subjects are influenced by a random (arbitrary) number (the last two digits of their Social Security number). This does not have to be the case in our study. We can assume that the first response comes from a set of values that are all "reasonable" (or "true") for the subject. Their response is stochastic but not arbitrary. Also, the social norm that regulates the second response is not arbitrary but normatively appealing. The fact that subjects try to be internally consistent in JE does not imply that the values elicited using JE are totally arbitrary or that they do not have normative status. This is the view of Frederick and Fischhoff (1998) when they write, "we do not believe that the demands of within-subject designs necessarily decrease the validity of the contingent responses-indeed, respondents in a within-subject quantity manipulation who report that a lot more of a good is worth a lot more to them may be revealing more about their true values than respondents in a between-subject design, who (collectively) indicate that a lot more of a good is only worth only a little more" (p. 116). More recently, Kahneman (2014) presented some reasons that also support the use of JE to guide social policy (and even individual decisions). He uses the example (taken from Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, & Kunreuther, 1993) of a study where subjects were asked in SE (between-subjects) their WTP for two insurance policies. In one group, the insurance policy paid $100,000 if the subject died, for any reason, during a holiday trip. In the second group, they were asked the WTP question for a similar policy that only paid $100,000 if the subject died, due to a terrorist attack, during the holiday trip. Subjects were willing to pay more for the second insurance policy. Kahneman (2014) argues that if people had been able to compare the two policies (that is, if they had evaluated the two policies in JE), they would have seen that the first gave a higher value to them and they would have been willing to pay more for the first policy. He attributes this disparity between EMs to what he calls "substitution." In SE, subjects respond to a different question to the one they are being asked (substitution). Because subjects find it very difficult to imagine how much they are willing to pay for an insurance policy they respond emotionally; that is, they are willing to pay more for the second policy because they are more afraid of dying in a terrorist attack than of death itself. However, in JE, they realise that it does not make sense to pay more for a policy that offers less protection. That is, under JE, they would take the best decision.
We can use this analogy when we move to health problems (this paper). When subjects are asked their WTP to reduce their risk of a certain injury, they respond according to the degree of fear that the injury generates. This argument that the valuation of health states mainly reflects the degree of "shock reaction to, or fear associated with, that state" (p. 223) has been used by Dolan and Kahneman (2008, p. 223) . It could be the case that states S1 and S3 generate the same degree of (low) fear because they are both mild. In the same way, more severe health states generate more fear and this increases WTP. However, there are reasons to think that preferences based on the intensity of emotions do not seem to be a good guide for social policy (Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004; Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & Macgregor, 2005) because feelings are very often not well correlated with benefits. We can think that JE requires subjects to think more rationally and less emotionally and this corrects the lack of scope effect that we can see in SE; the fact that subjects adjust their responses in order to be internally consistent in JE is also a manifestation of their preferences. Subjects realise that it does not make sense to pay more to avoid a health problem that is less severe than another one. Subjects may not know very well what is the right WTP for S1 or S3 (stochastic preferences), but they know that WTP for S1 cannot be bigger than for S3. In that respect, as Frederick and Fischhoff (1998) state, in JE subjects "may be revealing more about their true values" than in SE. In fact, the results obtained in JE seem to have better properties to guide social policy than the results obtained in SE. It does not make sense to accept that subjects' true preferences are that S1 and S3 are equally bad (as SE evaluations suggest) or that the benefit of preventing 10 injuries like S6 is equivalent only to preventing 24 like S1. At face value, this seems implausible, given how different they are. We conclude that, in the presence of imprecise or stochastic preferences, JE can be a better EM than SE and that CV can be improved using this response mode.
